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Abstract
We propose a Byzantine-robust variance-reduced stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) method to solve the distributed finite-
sum minimization problem when the data on the workers
are not independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Dur-
ing the learning process, an unknown number of Byzantine
workers may send malicious messages to the master node,
leading to remarkable learning error. Most of the Byzantine-
robust methods address this issue by using robust aggregation
rules to aggregate the received messages, but rely on the as-
sumption that all the regular workers have i.i.d. data, which
is not the case in many federated learning applications. In
light of the significance of reducing stochastic gradient noise
for mitigating the effect of Byzantine attacks, we use a re-
sampling strategy to reduce the impact of both inner varia-
tion (that describes the sample heterogeneity on every regular
worker) and outer variation (that describes the sample hetero-
geneity among the regular workers), along with a stochastic
average gradient algorithm (SAGA) to fully eliminate the in-
ner variation. The variance-reduced messages are then aggre-
gated with a robust geometric median operator. Under cer-
tain conditions, we prove that the proposed method reaches
a neighborhood of the optimal solution with linear conver-
gence rate, and the learning error is much smaller than those
given by the state-of-the-art methods in the non-i.i.d. setting.
Numerical experiments corroborate the theoretical results and
show satisfactory performance of the proposed method.
Introduction
With the rapid increase of data volume and computing
power, the past decades have witnessed the explosive de-
velopment of machine learning. However, many machine
learning methods require a central server or a cloud to col-
lect data from various owners and train models in a central-
ized manner, leading to serious privacy concerns. To address
this issue, federated learning proposes to keep data private
at their owners and carry out machine learning tasks locally
(Konecˇny` et al. 2016a,b; McMahan et al. 2016; Yang et al.
2019). Every data owner (called worker thereafter) performs
local computation based on its local data and sends the re-
sults (such as local models, gradients, stochastic gradients,
etc) to the central server. The central server (called mas-
ter node thereafter) aggregates the results received from the
workers and updates the global model.
† corresponding author.
Nevertheless, the distributed nature of federated learn-
ing makes it vulnerable to attacks (Kairouz et al. 2019).
Due to the heterogeneity of federated learning systems, not
all workers are reliable. During the learning process, some
workers might be malfunctioning or even malicious, and
send faulty messages to the master node. This paper consid-
ers the classical Byzantine attack model (Lamport, Shostak,
and Pease 1982), where an unknown number of Byzan-
tine workers are omniscient, collude with each other, and
send arbitrary malicious messages. Misled by the Byzantine
workers, the aggregation at the master node is problematic,
such that the federated learning method converges to an un-
satisfactory model or even diverge. For instance, the popular
distributed stochastic gradient descent (SGD) method fails
at presence of Byzantine attacks (Chen, Su, and Xu 2017).
Most of the Byzantine-robust distributed methods mod-
ify distributed SGD to handle Byzantine attacks, by replac-
ing mean aggregation with robust aggregation at the master
node (Yang, Gang, and Bajwa 2020; Xie, Koyejo, and Gupta
2020). When the data on the workers are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) and the local cost functions are
in the same form, stochastic gradients computed at the same
point are i.i.d. too. Therefore, various robust aggregation
rules, such as geometric median (Chen, Su, and Xu 2017),
can be applied to alleviate the effect of statistically biased
messages sent by Byzantine workers. Unfortunately, the data
on the workers are often non-i.i.d. in federated learning ap-
plications (Zhao et al. 2018; Li et al. 2020b). Thus, the mes-
sages sent by the regular workers are no longer i.i.d. such
that handling Byzantine attacks becomes more challenging.
In the Byzantine-robust federated learning setting, this pa-
per considers the distributed finite-sum minimization prob-
lem when the workers have non-i.i.d. data. The contributions
of this paper are summarized as follows.
C1) In light of the significance of reducing stochastic gradi-
ent noise for mitigating the effect of Byzantine attacks, we
propose a Byzantine-robust variance-reduced SGD method,
which uses a resampling strategy to reduce the impact of
both inner and outer variations while a stochastic average
gradient algorithm (SAGA) to fully eliminate the inner vari-
ation. The variance-reduced messages are then aggregated
with a robust geometric median operator.
C2) Under certain conditions, we prove that the proposed
method reaches a neighborhood of the optimal solution
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with linear convergence rate, and the learning error is much
smaller than those given by the state-of-the-art methods in
the non-i.i.d. setting.
C3) We conduct numerical experiments on convex and non-
convex learning problems and in i.i.d. and non-i.i.d. settings.
The experimental results corroborate the theoretical findings
and show satisfactory performance of the proposed method.
Related works
Byzantine-robust distributed machine learning has attracted
much attention in recent years. In distributed SGD, the mas-
ter node aggregates messages received from the workers
by taking average and uses the mean as aggregated gradi-
ent direction. The mean aggregation, however, is vulnerable
to Byzantine attacks. Existing Byzantine-robust distributed
methods mostly extend the distributed SGD with robust ag-
gregation rules, such as geometric median (Chen, Su, and Xu
2017), coordinate-wise median (Yin et al. 2018), coordinate-
wise trimmed mean (Yin et al. 2018), Krum (Blanchard
et al. 2017), multi-Krum (Blanchard et al. 2017), Bulyan
(El Mhamdi, Guerraoui, and Rouault 2018), to name a few.
Another approach is to detect and discard outliers from the
received messages (Rodrı´guez-Barroso et al. 2020; Azulay
et al. 2020; Li et al. 2020a). When the received stochastic
gradients from the regular workers satisfy the i.i.d. assump-
tion, the statistically different malicious messages from the
Byzantine workers can be detected and discarded, or their
negative effect can be alleviated by robust aggregation rules.
Aiming at Byzantine-robustness with distributed non-
i.i.d. data, (Li et al. 2019) proposes a robust stochastic aggre-
gation method that employs model aggregation rather than
stochastic gradient aggregation. Forced by the introduced
consensus constraints, the regular workers and the master
node shall reach consensus on their local models, no mat-
ter the local data are i.i.d. or not. (Dong et al. 2020) also
imposes asymptotic consensus between the regular workers
and the master node, and proposes a Byzantine-robust prox-
imal stochastic gradient method. (Ghosh et al. 2019) divides
the cost functions of the workers into several clusters, such
that within each cluster the i.i.d. assumption approximately
holds. Then robust aggregation can be applied within each
cluster. (He, Karimireddy, and Jaggi 2020) introduces a re-
sampling strategy to reduce the heterogeneity of the received
messages in the non-i.i.d. setting.
In both i.i.d. and non-i.i.d. settings, variance of the mes-
sages sent by the regular workers plays a critical role to
Byzantine-robustness. Larger variance means that the ma-
licious messages are harder to distinguish. Theoretically,
the variance can be classified into inner variation that de-
scribes the sample heterogeneity on every regular worker
and outer variation that describes the sample heterogene-
ity among the regular workers. In the i.i.d. setting the in-
ner variation often dominates, while in the non-i.i.d. set-
ting the outer variation can be large. (Wu et al. 2020) uses
SAGA to correct the stochastic gradients and aggregate the
corrected stochastic gradients with geometric median. It has
been proven that the impact of inner variation is fully elim-
inated from the learning error. (Khanduri et al. 2019) com-
bines stochastic variance-reduced gradient (SVRG) with ro-
bust aggregation to solve distributed non-convex problems.
(El Mhamdi, Guerraoui, and Rouault 2020) proves that the
momentum method can reduce the variance of the stochas-
tic gradients for the regular workers relative to their norm,
and is thus helpful to Byzantine-robustness. The resampling
strategy used in (He, Karimireddy, and Jaggi 2020) reduces
the impact of inner and outer variations simultaneously.
Problem Formulation and Preliminaries
Consider a distributed network containing one master node
andW := R+B workers, among whichR workers are reg-
ular and B workers are Byzantine. During the learning pro-
cess, the Byzantine workers are supposed to be omniscient,
and can collude to send arbitrary malicious messages to the
master node (Lamport, Shostak, and Pease 1982). Denote
the sets of regular and Byzantine workers as R and B, re-
spectively, withR = |R| andB = |B|. DenoteW := R∪B
as the set of all workers, with W = |W|. The goal is to find
an optimal solution to the finite-sum minimization problem
x∗ = arg min
x
f(x) :=
1
R
∑
w∈R
fw(x), (1)
with
fw(x) :=
1
J
J∑
j=1
fw,j(x). (2)
Here x ∈ Rp is the optimization variable, and fw(x) is the
local cost function of regular worker w that averages the
costs fw,j(x) of J samples. The samples are not necessar-
ily i.i.d. across the regular workers. This form of finite-sum
minimization problem arises in many federated learning ap-
plications (Yang et al. 2019).
Geometric median. When the Byzantine workers are ab-
sent, distributed SGD (Bottou 2010) is a popular method to
solve (1). The update of distributed SGD is given by
xk+1 = xk − γ · 1
W
W∑
w=1
f ′w,ikw(x
k), (3)
where γ is the step size and ikw is the sample index cho-
sen by worker w at time k. Upon receiving xk from the
master node, every worker w computes a stochastic gradient
f ′w,ikw(x
k) and returns to the master node. The master node
then averages the received stochastic gradients and updates
xk+1. However, distributed SGD is vulnerable to Byzantine
attacks. Even there is only one Byzantine worker, it can re-
place the true stochastic gradient with a malicious message,
such that the average at the master node becomes zero or
infinitely large (Yang, Gang, and Bajwa 2020).
To address this issue, most of the Byzantine-robust meth-
ods aggregate the received messages with robust aggregation
rules, among which we focus on geometric median (Chen,
Su, and Xu 2017). To be specific, define gkw as the message
sent by worker w at time k to the master node, given by
gkw =
{
f ′w,ikw(x
k), w ∈ R,
∗, w ∈ B. (4)
When w is a regular worker, it sends the true stochastic gra-
dient f ′w,ikw(x
k). Otherwise when w is a Byzantine worker,
it sends an arbitrary message denoted by ∗. Upon receiving
all the messages, the master node calculates the geometric
median of {gkw, w ∈ W}, which is
geomed
({gkw, w ∈ W}) := arg min
g
W∑
w=1
‖g − gkw‖2. (5)
Then, the master node updates xk+1 by replacing the aver-
age in (3) with the geometric median, as
xk+1 = xk − γ · geomed ({gkw, w ∈ W}) . (6)
It has been proved that when the regular workers have i.i.d.
data, incorporating distributed SGD and geometric median
allows us to tolerate Byzantine attacks when less than half
of the workers are malicious, namely, B < W2 (Chen, Su,
and Xu 2017).
Byrd-SAGA. Intuitively, when the stochastic gradients sent
by the regular workers have large variance, it is difficult to
distinguish the malicious messages from the true stochastic
gradients. This motivates the combination of variance reduc-
tion techniques with the robust aggregation rules. One ex-
ample is Byrd-SAGA that combines SAGA with geometric
median (Wu et al. 2020). Instead of sending the stochastic
gradients to the master node, the regular workers send the
corrected, variance-reduced stochastic gradients. To be spe-
cific, every regular worker stores the most recent stochastic
gradient for every of its samples. When regular workerw se-
lects the sample index ikw at time k, the corrected stochastic
gradient is
f ′w,ikw(x
k)− f ′w,ikw(φ
k
w,ikw
) +
1
J
J∑
j=1
f ′w,j(φ
k
w,j), (7)
where
φk+1w,j =
{
φkw,j , j 6= ikw,
xk, j = ikw.
(8)
That is, the stochastic gradient f ′w,ikw(x
k) is corrected by
first subtracting the previously stored stochastic gradient
f ′w,ikw(φ
k
w,ikw
) for sample ikw, and then adding the average
of all the stored stochastic gradients f ′w,j(φ
k
w,j). At time k,
denote vkw as the corrected stochastic gradient if w is regular
and an arbitrary message ∗ if w is Byzantine, given by
vkw =

f ′w,ikw(x
k)− f ′w,ikw(φ
k
w,ikw
)
+
1
J
J∑
j=1
f ′w,j(φ
k
w,j), w ∈ R,
∗, w ∈ B.
(9)
Then, the update of Byrd-SAGA is
xk+1 = xk − γ · geomed ({vkw, w ∈ W}) . (10)
It has been proven in (Wu et al. 2020) that Byrd-SAGA can
eliminate the inner variation but the effect of outer variation
still exists. For the non-i.i.d. case, the outer variation can be
very large, such that the learning error of Byrd-SAGA is still
considerable in federated learning applications.
Resampling. (He, Karimireddy, and Jaggi 2020) proposes a
resampling strategy to reduce the impact of both inner vari-
ation and outer variation for the the non-i.i.d. case, as illus-
trated in Algorithm 1. Consider the messages {gkw, w ∈ W}
defined in (4). The master node takesW rounds of sampling,
and samples s messages at every round. When one message
has been sampled for s times, it is excluded from the pool.
At the end of round w, the master node averages the s sam-
pled messages to calculate g˜kw. We denote this resampling
procedure with s-replacement as
{g˜kw, w ∈ W} = resampling
({gkw, w ∈ W}, s) . (11)
Then, (He, Karimireddy, and Jaggi 2020) uses Krum (Blan-
chard et al. 2017) to aggregate the new messages {g˜kw, w ∈W}. However, the resampling strategy is unable to fully
eliminate either the inner variation or the outer variation, and
thus the performance of robust aggregation is still limited.
Algorithm 1 Resampling with s-replacement (He, Karim-
ireddy, and Jaggi 2020)
Input: {gkw, w ∈ W}, s
1: Initialize {cw = 0, w ∈ W}
2: for w = 1, · · · , W do
3: for ζ = 1, · · · , s do
4: Select wζ ∼ Uniform({w|w ∈ W, cw < s})
5: cwζ = cwζ + 1
6: Compute average g˜kw =
1
s
∑s
ζ=1 g
k
wζ
7: Return {g˜kw, w ∈ W}
Algorithm Development
As discussed above, Byrd-SAGA can eliminate the inner
variation but the effect of outer variation still exists, while
the resampling strategy only reduces the impact of inner and
outer variations. Neither of them is able to adequately ad-
dress the issue of robust aggregation over distributed non-
i.i.d. data, where both variations can be large. Therefore, we
propose to use a resampling strategy to reduce the impact of
inner and outer variations, along with SAGA to fully elimi-
nate the inner variation. The variance-reduced messages are
then aggregated with a robust geometric median operator.
Our proposed method is described in Algorithm 2. At time
k, the master node broadcast its current variable xk to all the
workers. Upon receiving xk, every regular worker w ∈ R
uniformly randomly selects a sample ikw ∈ {1, · · · , J}
to obtain the stochastic gradient f ′w,ikw(x
k), calculates the
corrected stochastic gradient vkw according to (9), stores
f ′w,ikw(x
k) in the stochastic gradient table, and then sends
the corrected stochastic gradient vkw to the master node. In
contrast, every Byzantine worker w ∈ B sends an arbitrary
malicious message vkw to the master node. After receiving
the messages {vkw, w ∈ W} from all the workers, the master
node generates a set of new messages {v˜kw, w ∈ W} using
Algorithm 1, given by
{v˜kw, w ∈ W} = resampling
({vkw, w ∈ W}, s) . (12)
Finally, the master node updates the variable from
xk+1 = xk − γ · geomed ({v˜kw, w ∈ W}) . (13)
Algorithm 2 Byzantine-Robust Variance-Reduced Feder-
ated Learning over Distributed Non-i.i.d. Data
Master node:
1: Input: x0 ∈ Rp, γ, s. At time k:
2: Broadcast its current variable xk to all workers
3: Receive messages {vkw, w ∈ W} from all workers
4: Generate {v˜kw, w ∈ W} according to Algorithm 1 with
parameter s
5: Update xk+1 = xk − γ · geomed ({v˜kw, w ∈ W})
Regular worker w:
1: Initialize: {f ′w,j(φ0w,j) = f ′w,j(x0), j ∈ {1, · · · , J}}.
At time k:
2: Receive variable xk from master node
3: Compute g¯kw =
1
J
∑J
j=1 f
′
w,j(φ
k
w,j).
4: Sample ikw uniformly randomly from j ∈ {1, · · · , J}
5: Update vkw = f
′
w,ikw
(xk)− f ′w,ikw(φ
k
w,ikw
) + g¯kw
6: Store stochastic gradient f ′w,ikw(φ
k
w,ikw
) = f ′w,ikw(x
k)
7: Send corrected stochastic gradient vkw to master node
Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we theoretically analyze the performance of
the proposed method, as well as investigate the effect of re-
ducing the inner and outer variations on robust aggregation.
We start from introducing three assumptions on the sam-
ple costs {fw,j , w ∈ R, j = {1, · · · , J}}. We use E to de-
note the expectation with respect to all random variables ikw.
Assumption 1. (Strong convexity and Lipschitz continuous
gradients) The function f is µ-strong convex and has L-
Lipschitz continuous gradients. Namely, for any x, y ∈ Rp,
it holds that
f(y) ≥ f(x) + 〈f ′(x), y − x〉+ µ
2
‖y − x‖2, (14)
and
‖f ′(y)− f ′(x)‖ ≤ L‖y − x‖. (15)
Assumption 2. (Bounded outer variation) For any x ∈ Rp,
the variation of the local gradients at the regular workers
with respect to the global gradient is upper-bounded by
1
R
∑
w∈R
‖f ′w(x)− f ′(x)‖2 ≤ δ2. (16)
Assumption 3. (Bounded inner variation) For every reg-
ular worker w ∈ R and any x ∈ Rp, the variation of
its stochastic gradients with respect to its local gradient is
upper-bounded by
Eikw‖f ′w,ikw(x)− f
′
w(x)‖2 ≤ σ2, ∀w ∈ R. (17)
gradients with large variations gradients with small variations
regular gradient
true gradient
Byzantine gradient
geometric median
Figure 1: An illustration of the impact of inner and outer
variations on geometric median under Byzantine attacks.
Suppose that 8 regular workers sample stochastic gradi-
ents from 4 distributions. When the variations are large, the
Byzantine-free true average is far away from the geometric
median under Byzantine attacks. In contrast, when the vari-
ations are small, the gap is small too.
Assumption 1 is standard for analyzing distributed learn-
ing algorithms. Assumptions 2 and 3 bound the inner varia-
tion that describes the sample heterogeneity on every regular
worker and the outer variation that describes the sample het-
erogeneity among the regular workers, respectively. When
all the samples at the regular workers are identical, both the
inner variation and the outer variation are zero. When the
distributed data are i.i.d. the inner variation is often larger
than the outer variation, while for the non-i.i.d. case the outer
variation usually dominates.
Concentration property of geometric median. To under-
stand the importance of variance reduction to robust aggre-
gation, we show the concentration property of geometric
median in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let {zw, w ∈ W} be a subset of random vectors
distributed in a normed vector space. It holds when B < W2
that
E‖geomed ({zw, w ∈ W})− z¯‖2 (18)
≤C
2
α
R
∑
w∈R
E‖zw − Ezw‖2 + C
2
α
R
∑
w∈R
‖Ezw − z¯‖2,
where z¯ := 1R
∑
w∈R Ezw, α :=
B
W , and Cα :=
2−2α
1−2α .
Suppose zw = gkw as defined (4), such that zw is the true
stochastic gradient when w is regular, and an arbitrary ma-
licious message when w is Byzantine. The left-hand side of
(18) denotes the mean-square error of the geometric median
relative to the average of the true stochastic gradients. The
right-hand side of (18) contains two terms. The first term
now refers to the overall inner variation, while the second
term refers to the outer variation. When either the inner vari-
ation or the outer variation is large, the geometric median
aggregation yields a poor direction that eventually leads to
large learning error, as illustrated in Figure 1. This fact moti-
vates Byrd-SAGA. It has been shown in (Wu et al. 2020) that
SAGA effectively eliminates the inner variation of the mes-
sages sent by the regular workers. Therefore, if we replace
zw = v
k
w as defined in (9), the first term at the right-hand
side of (18) vanishes. However, for the non-i.i.d. case, the
second term at the right-hand side of (18) can be large and
still deteriorate the performance of robust aggregation.
Concentration property of geometric median after re-
sampling. Interestingly, augmented with the resampling
strategy, geometric median shows better dependency on both
the inner variation and the outer variation, as shown in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let {zw, w ∈ W} be a subset of random vectors
distributed in a normed vector space and the random vectors
in {zw, w ∈ R} are independent. Generate from {zw, w ∈
W} a new set {z˜w, w ∈ W} using the resampling strategy
with s-replacement. It holds when B < W2s that
E‖geomed ({z˜w, w ∈ W})− z¯‖2 (19)
≤
(
d+
1− d
R
)
C2sα
R
∑
w∈R
E‖zw − Ezw‖2
+
dC2sα
R
∑
w∈R
‖Ezw − z¯‖2,
where z¯ := 1R
∑
w∈R Ezw, α :=
B
W , Csα :=
2−2sα
1−2sα , and
d := W−1sW−1 .
Comparing the bounds of mean-square errors given by
(18) and (19), we observe that the coefficients change. When
s = 1, the two bounds are identical. When s > 1, the coef-
ficients in (19) smaller than those in (18) if α is sufficiently
small, meaning that the inner variation and the outer varia-
tion are simultaneously reduced. The cost, however, is toler-
ating a smaller fraction of Byzantine workers. We will nu-
merically depict the effect of variance reduction in Figure 2
when discussing the main theorem.
Note that (He, Karimireddy, and Jaggi 2020) analyzes the
combination of resampling and Krum. This analysis for the
combination of resampling and geometric median is new.
Again, suppose zw = gkw as defined in (4). Then, the right-
hand side of (19) contains two terms, one for inner vari-
ation and another for outer variation. As discussed above,
the combination of distributed SGD with geometric median
and resampling can reduce the dependency on both the inner
and outer variations comparing to that without resampling,
but cannot eliminate the inner variation. We shall see in the
main theorem that, the further introduction of SAGA in our
proposed method is able to eliminate the inner variation, and
hence leads to reduced learning error.
Main theorem. The following main theorem establishes the
convergence property of the proposed method.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if the number of
Byzantine workers satisfies B < W2s and the step size satis-
fies
γ ≤ µ
2
√
10J2L2Csα
,
then the iterate xk generated by the proposed method in Al-
gorithm 2 satisfies
E‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− γµ
2
)k∆1 + ∆2, (20)
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Figure 2: Learning error versus α, the fraction of Byzantine
workers, for Byrd-SAGA and the proposed method with dif-
ferent s. We omit δ2 in the learning errors to compare C2α
with dC2sα. The number of all workers is set as W = 30.
where
∆1 := ‖x0 − x∗‖2 −∆2, (21)
∆2 :=
5dC2sαδ
2
µ2
, (22)
while α := BW , Csα :=
2−2sα
1−2sα , and d :=
W−1
sW−1 .
Theorem 1 shows that the proposed method reaches a
neighborhood of the optimal solution at a linear convergence
rate. The learning error ∆2 in the order of O(dC2sαδ
2) is de-
termined by the outer variation, but irrelevant with the inner
variation. In contrast, the learning error of Byrd-SAGA is in
the order of O(C2αδ
2) when B < W2 . For the combination
of distributed SGD and geometric median (that we call as
Byrd-SGD) and the combination of distributed SGD, resam-
pling and geometric median (that we call as RS-Byrd-SGD),
the learning errors are in the orders of O(C2ασ
2 + C2αδ
2)
and O((d + 1−dR )C
2
sασ
2 + dC2sαδ
2) when B < W2 and
B < W2s , respectively. Note that the analysis of Byrd-SAGA
also needs Assumptions 1 and 2, while that of Byrd-SGD
and RS-Byrd-SGD need Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. We list all
the learning errors in Table 1.
Algorithm Require. Learning Error
Byrd-SGD B < W2 O(C
2
ασ
2 + C2αδ
2)
RS-Byrd-SGD B < W2s O((d+
1−d
R )C
2
sασ
2 + dC2sαδ
2)
Byrd-SAGA B < W2 O(C
2
αδ
2)
Our Proposed B < W2s O(dC
2
sαδ
2)
Table 1: Requirements & learning errors of four algorithms.
Figure 2 shows the dependency of learning error on α :=
B
W for Byrd-SAGA and the proposed method with different
s, which eliminate the impact of inner variation. We omit
the outer variation δ2 in the learning errors and compare C2α
with dC2sα. The number of all workers is set as W = 30,
which is consistent with the setting in the numerical ex-
periments. Observe that when α is small enough, the pro-
posed method has smaller learning error than Byrd-SAGA.
This fact depicts the advantage of resampling in reducing
the outer variation and handling the non-i.i.d. data. The side-
effect of resampling is the tolerance to a smaller fraction of
Byzantine workers. Larger s means tolerance to less Byzan-
tine workers. According to the analysis, s = 2 achieves sat-
isfactory tradeoff between the learning error and the tolera-
ble fraction of Byzantine workers. Therefore, in the numer-
ical experiments we set s = 2, which is also recommended
by (He, Karimireddy, and Jaggi 2020).
Note that (5) has no closed-form solution, and must be
solved with iterative algorithms. Therefore, we often con-
sider -approximate geometric median, allowing the com-
puted vector and the true geometric median has a gap of .
For simplicity, in the analysis above we assume  = 0. In the
supplementary material, we also consider the case of  6= 0.
Numerical Experiments
This section presents numerical experiments to demonstrate
the robustness of our proposed method. We consider both
convex and nonconvex distributed learning problems. For
the convex problem, we focus on the softmax regression on
the MNIST1 dataset. For the nonconvex problem, we train
two-layer perceptrons, in which each layer has 50 neurons
and the activation function is ‘tanh’, on the MINST and
COVTYPE2 datasets. The attributes of the datasets are de-
scribed in Table 2. In the i.i.d. case, we use the MNIST
dataset, launch 1 master node and W = 30 workers, and
let the data evenly distributed across all workers. In the non-
i.i.d. case, we first use the MNIST dataset, launch 1 master
node and W = 30 workers, and let every three workers to
evenly share the data from one class. We then use the COV-
TYPE dataset, launch 1 master node and W = 21 work-
ers, and also let every three workers to evenly share the data
from one class. The numerical experiments are conducted
on a server with two Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4216 CPUs
and four GeForce RTX 2080 GPUs.
Name Train Test Dimensions Classes
MNIST 60000 10000 784 10
COVTYPE 11340 565892 54 7
Table 2: Attributes of the MNIST and COVTYPE datasets.
Benchmark methods
We compare our proposed method with several benchmarks.
Distributed SGD. The distributed SGD aggregates the re-
ceived messages by returning the mean, and hence has no
robustness against Byzantine attacks.
Byrd-SGD. Byrd-SGD aggregates the received messages by
returning the geometric median, as shown in (6).
RS-Byrd-SGD. RS-Byrd-SGD first resamples the received
messages with s-replacement, and then aggregates the re-
sults by returning the geometric median.
1http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
2https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/covertype
Krum. Krum aggregates the received messages by returning
the one that has the smallest summation of squared distances
to its W −B − 2 nearest neighbors, given by
Krum({zw, w ∈ W}) = zw∗ ,
w∗ = arg min
w∈W
∑
w→w′
‖zw − zw′‖2.
Here w → w′ selects the indexes w′ of the W − B − 2
nearest neighbors of zw in {zw, w ∈ W}. Note that Krum
needs to know the number of Byzantine workers in advance.
Byrd-SAGA. Byrd-SAGA aggregates the received mes-
sages by returning the geometric median, but the regular
workers returns the corrected stochastic gradients, not the
stochastic gradients in the above benchmark methods.
RSA. RSA is based on model aggregation, not stochastic
gradient aggregation in the above benchmark methods. The
master node and every worker w maintains iterates xk0 and
xkw, respectively. The update rule of the master node is
xk+10 = x
k
0 − γ · λ
∑
w∈W
sign(xk0 − xkw),
while the update rule of regular worker w ∈ R is
xk+1i = x
k
i − γ ·
(
f ′w,ikw(x
k
w) + λsign(x
k
w − xk0)
)
.
Here sign is the element-wise sign function and λ > 0 is the
penalty parameter.
In the numerical experiments, the batch size is set as 32.
When using resampling, we set s = 2. All parameters in the
benchmark methods are hand-tuned to the best.
Byzantine attacks
We consider the following Byzantine attacks.
Sign-flipping attacks. Every Byzantine worker computes
its true message, multiplies it with a constant c < 0, and
sends to the master node. Here we set c = −5.
Gaussian attacks. Every Byzantine worker sends messages,
whose elements follow Gaussian distribution N (0, 10000),
to the master node.
Sample-duplicating attacks. The Byzantine workers col-
lude to choose a specific regular worker, and duplicate its
message at every time. This amounts to that the Byzantine
workers duplicate the data samples of the chosen regular
worker. We only apply the sample-duplicating attacks in the
non-i.i.d. case.
Robustness in i.i.d. case
We carry out numerical experiments in softmax regression
on the MNIST dataset. The step size of our proposed method
is γ = 0.5. When there exist Byzantine attacks, we uni-
formly randomly select B = 6 Byzantine workers.
Without Byzantine attacks. When there exist no Byzantine
attacks, all the methods are able to achieve satisfactory clas-
sification accuracies, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Sign-flipping attacks. As depicted in Figure 4, the dis-
tributed SGD is vulnerable and fails under the sign-flipping
attacks. The other methods all perform well.
Gaussian attacks. The results of Gaussian attacks are
shown in Figure 5. The distributed SGD also fails, while the
other methods have robustness to Gaussian attacks.
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Figure 3: Without Byzantine attacks on
i.i.d. MNIST data in softmax regression.
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Figure 4: With sign-flipping attacks on
i.i.d. MNIST data in softmax regression.
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Figure 5: With Gaussian attacks on i.i.d.
MNIST data in softmax regression.
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Figure 6: With sample-duplicating at-
tacks on non-i.i.d. MNIST data in soft-
max regression.
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Figure 7: With sample-duplicating at-
tacks on non-i.i.d. MNIST data in neural
network training.
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Figure 8: With sample-duplicating at-
tacks on non-i.i.d. COVTYPE data in
neural network training.
Robustness in non-i.i.d. case
Sample-duplicating attacks on MNIST in softmax re-
gression. We choose B = 6 workers that originally share
the samples of two classes as Byzantine workers. Therefore,
these two classes essentially disappear under the sample-
duplication attacks, such that the best possible accuracy is
0.8. For the regular worker that is chosen to be duplicated,
its class now has 9 workers out of the total W = 30. The
step size of our proposed method is γ = 0.5. As shown in
Figure 5, our proposed method is able to achieve the classifi-
cation accuracy of around 0.73. RS-Byrd-SGD also demon-
strates robustness since the resampling strategy helps reduce
the impact of both inner and outer variations. However, as
we have shown in the theoretical analysis, solely using re-
sampling is unable to fully eliminate the inner variation. In
contrast, the proposed method introduces SAGA to address
this issue, yielding enhanced classification accuracy. RSA
works well since it is developed to handle the non-i.i.d. case.
The other Byzantine-robust methods, Byrd-SGD, Krum and
Byrd-SAGA, all show degraded performance since they are
essentially designed for distributed i.i.d. data.
Sample-duplicating attacks on MNIST in neural net-
work training. We choose B = 3 workers that originally
share the samples of one class as Byzantine workers, such
that the best possible accuracy is 0.9 under the sample-
duplicating attacks. The step size of our proposed method
is γ = 0.1. We compare Byrd-SGD, RS-Byrd-SGD, Byrd-
SAGA and our proposed method in Figure 7. Byrd-SGD
fails, but Byrd-SAGA is able to attain favorable classifica-
tion accuracy since the ratio of Byzantine workers is only
10%. Among the two methods developed for the non-i.i.d.
case, our proposed method outperforms RS-Byrd-SGD. The
performance gain of Byrd-SAGA over Byrd-SGD and that
of the proposed method over RS-Byrd-SGD are both due to
the elimination of inner variation.
Sample-duplicating attacks on COVTYPE in neural net-
work training. We choose B = 3 workers that originally
share the samples of one class as Byzantine workers, such
that the best possible accuracy is 0.86 under the sample-
duplicating attacks. The step size of our proposed method is
γ = 0.1. As shown in Figure 8, Byrd-SGD is still the worst.
However, Byrd-SAGA and RS-Byrd-SGD are both remark-
ably outperformed by our proposed method, since the ratio
of Byzantine workers is now raised to 14%. Therefore, elim-
inating the inner variation and reducing the outer variation
are of particular importance as a larger portion of received
messages are Byzantine.
Conclusions
We develop a Byzantine-robust variance-reduced method to
deal with the finite-sum minimization problem with dis-
tributed non-i.i.d. data. To reduce the impact of stochastic
gradient noise that hinders the resistance to Byzantine at-
tacks, we adopt the resampling strategy and SAGA to re-
duce the outer variation and fully eliminate the inner vari-
ation. The variance-reduced messages are then aggregated
by geometric median. Theoretical results show that the pro-
posed method can reach a neighborhood of the optimal so-
lution with linear convergence rate and the learning error is
determined by the number of Byzantine workers. Numeri-
cal experiments demonstrate the robustness of our proposed
method. In the future work, we will investigate the elimi-
nation of outer variation, and the combination of variance-
reduced methods with other robust aggregation rules.
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Supplementary Material for
Byzantine-Robust Variance-Reduced Federated Learning over Distributed Non-i.i.d. Data
Proof of Lemma 1
To prove Lemma 1, we review the following supporting lemma.
Lemma 3. (Wu et al. 2020, Lemmas 2 and 3) Let {zw, w ∈ W} be a subset of random vectors distributed in a normed vector
space. It holds when B < W2 that
E‖geomed ({zw, w ∈ W}) ‖2 ≤ C
2
α
R
∑
w∈R
E‖zw‖2, (23)
where α := BW and Cα :=
2−2α
1−2α . Define z
∗
 is an -approximate geometric median of {zw, w ∈ W}. It holds when B < W2
that
E‖z∗ ‖2 ≤
2C2α
R
∑
w∈R
E‖zw‖2 + 2
2
(W − 2B)2 . (24)
Lemma 4. (Full version of Lemma 1) Let {zw, w ∈ W} be a subset of random vectors distributed in a normed vector space.
It holds when B < W2 that
E‖geomed ({zw, w ∈ W})− z¯‖2 ≤ C
2
α
R
∑
w∈R
E‖zw − Ezw‖2 + C
2
α
R
∑
w∈R
‖Ezw − z¯‖2, (25)
where z¯ := 1R
∑
w∈R Ezw, α :=
B
W , and Cα :=
2−2α
1−2α . Define z
∗
 as an -approximate geometric median of {zw, w ∈ W}. It
holds when B < W2 that
E‖z∗ − z¯‖2 ≤
2C2α
R
∑
w∈R
E‖zw − Ezw‖2 + 2C
2
α
R
∑
w∈R
‖Ezw − z¯‖2 + 2
2
(W − 2B)2 . (26)
Proof. For simplicity, we only prove (25). With Lemma 3, it holds that
E‖geomed ({zw, w ∈ W})− z¯‖2 (27)
=E‖geomed ({zw − z¯, w ∈ W}) ‖2
≤C
2
α
R
∑
w∈R
E‖zw − z¯‖2
=
C2α
R
∑
w∈R
E‖zw − Ezw‖2 + C
2
α
R
∑
w∈R
‖Ezw − z¯‖2,
where the last equality uses the decomposition
1
R
∑
w∈R
E‖zw − z¯‖2 = 1
R
∑
w∈R
E ‖zw − Ezw‖2 + 1
R
∑
w∈R
‖Ezw − z¯‖2 . (28)
This completes the proof.
Note that the first part of Lemma 4 has a similar form as Lemma 1 in (Wu et al. 2020), but the coefficients are reduced by a
factor of 2 due to the proper use of the decomposition in (28).
Proof of Lemma 2
We begin with reviewing the following supporting lemma.
Lemma 5. (He, Karimireddy, and Jaggi 2020, Proposition 1) Let {zw, w ∈ W} be a subset of vectors distributed in a normed
vector space, and generate from it a new set {z˜w, w ∈ W} using the resampling strategy with s-replacement. When B < Ws ,
there exists a setR′ ⊆ W with at least W − sB elements, such that for any w′ ∈ R′ it holds that
Ez˜w′ =
1
R
∑
w∈R
zw, (29)
E‖z˜w′ − Ez˜w′‖2 = d
R
∑
w∈R
∥∥∥∥∥zw − 1R ∑
u∈R
zu
∥∥∥∥∥
2
, (30)
where d := W−1sW−1 and the expectation E is taken for the resampling process.
Lemma 5 shows that after resampling, the expectations of at leastW −sB elements are close to the average of {zw, w ∈ R}.
The variance E‖z˜w − Ez˜w‖2 reduces by a factor of 1d relative to the variation 1R
∑
w∈R ‖zw − 1R
∑
w∈R zw‖2. Note that 1d is
close to s if W is sufficiently large. We further investigate the properties of these W − sB elements in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let {zw, w ∈ W} be a subset of random vectors distributed in a normed vector space and the random vectors
in {zw, w ∈ R} are independent. Generate from {zw, w ∈ W} a new set {z˜w, w ∈ W} using the resampling strategy with
s-replacement. When B < Ws , there exists a set R′ ⊆ W with at least W − sB elements, such that for any w′ ∈ R′, (29) and
(30) hold true, and
1
|R′|
∑
w′∈R′
E‖z˜w′ − z¯‖2 ≤
(
d+
1− d
R
)
1
R
∑
w∈R
E ‖zw − Ezw‖2 + d
R
∑
w∈R
‖Ezw − z¯‖2 , (31)
where d := W−1sW−1 and z¯ :=
1
R
∑
w∈R Ezw.
Proof. We decompose the term 1|R′|
∑
w′∈R′ E‖z˜w′ − z¯‖2 into two terms
1
|R′|
∑
w′∈R′
E‖z˜w′ − z¯‖2 (32)
=
1
|R′|
∑
w′∈R′
E
∥∥∥∥∥z˜w′ − 1R ∑
w∈R
zw
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+ E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1R ∑
w∈R
zw − z¯
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ d
R
∑
w∈R
E
∥∥∥∥∥zw − 1R ∑
u∈R
zu
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+ E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1R ∑
w∈R
zw − z¯
∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
where the inequality comes from Lemma 5 that for any w′ ∈ R′ it holds
E
∥∥∥∥∥z˜w′ − 1R ∑
w∈R
zw
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= E ‖z˜w′ − Ez˜w′‖2 ≤ d
R
∑
w∈R
E
∥∥∥∥∥zw − 1R ∑
u∈R
zu
∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (33)
The first term at the right-hand side of (32) can be further decomposed into three terms
1
R
∑
w∈R
E
∥∥∥∥∥zw − 1R ∑
u∈R
zu
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(34)
=
1
R
∑
w∈R
E
∥∥∥∥∥(zw − Ezw) +
(
Ezw − 1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu
)
+
(
1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu − 1
R
∑
u∈R
zu
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
R
∑
w∈R
E ‖zw − Ezw‖2 + 1
R
∑
w∈R
∥∥∥∥∥Ezw − 1R ∑
u∈R
Ezu
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+ E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1R ∑
w∈R
zw − 1
R
∑
w∈R
Ezw
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
2
R
∑
w∈R
E
〈
zw − Ezw,Ezw − 1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu
〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+
2
R
∑
w∈R
E
〈
Ezw − 1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu,
1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu − 1
R
∑
u∈R
zu
〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
+
2
R
∑
w∈R
E
〈
zw − Ezw, 1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu − 1
R
∑
u∈R
zu
〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
=
1
R
∑
w∈R
E ‖zw − Ezw‖2 + 1
R
∑
w∈R
∥∥∥∥∥Ezw − 1R ∑
u∈R
Ezu
∥∥∥∥∥
2
− E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1R ∑
w∈R
zw − 1
R
∑
w∈R
Ezw
∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
To see how to reach the last equality, we check the three cross terms. The first cross term can be cancelled by
T1 =
2
R
∑
w∈R
E
〈
zw − Ezw,Ezw − 1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu
〉
(35)
=
2
R
∑
w∈R
〈
Ezw − Ezw︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
,Ezw − 1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu
〉
=0.
Similarly, the second cross term can be cancelled by
T2 =
2
R
∑
w∈R
E
〈
Ezw − 1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu,
1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu − 1
R
∑
u∈R
zu
〉
(36)
=
2
R
∑
w∈R
〈
Ezw − 1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu,
1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu − 1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
〉
=0.
The third cross term equals to
T3 =
2
R
∑
w∈R
E
〈
zw − Ezw, 1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu − 1
R
∑
u∈R
zu
〉
(37)
=2E
〈
1
R
∑
w∈R
zw − 1
R
∑
w∈R
Ezw,
1
R
∑
u∈R
Ezu − 1
R
∑
u∈R
zu
〉
=− 2E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1R ∑
w∈R
zw − 1
R
∑
w∈R
Ezw
∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
Substituting (34) into (32) and using the definition z¯ := 1R
∑
w∈R Ezw, we have
1
|R′|
∑
w′∈R′
E‖z˜w′ − z¯‖2 (38)
≤ d
R
∑
w∈R
E ‖zw − Ezw‖2 + d
R
∑
w∈R
∥∥∥∥∥Ezw − 1R ∑
u∈R
Ezu
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+ (1− d)E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1R ∑
w∈R
zw − 1
R
∑
w∈R
Ezw
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
d
R
∑
w∈R
E ‖zw − Ezw‖2 + d
R
∑
w∈R
‖Ezw − z¯‖2 + 1− d
R2
∑
w∈R
E ‖zw − Ezw‖2
=
(
d+
1− d
R
)
1
R
∑
w∈R
E ‖zw − Ezw‖2 + d
R
∑
w∈R
‖Ezw − z¯‖2 .
The first equality in (38) comes from
E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1R ∑
w∈R
zw − 1
R
∑
w∈R
Ezw
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1R ∑
w∈R
(zw − Ezw)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(39)
=
1
R2
∑
w∈R
E ‖zw − Ezw‖2 +
∑
w,u∈R
w 6=u
E
〈
1
R
(zw − Ezw), 1
R
(zu − Ezu)
〉
=
1
R2
∑
w∈R
E ‖zw − Ezw‖2 ,
where the last equality is due to the fact that the random vectors in {zw, w ∈ R} are independent. This completes the proof.
Now we compare the two bounds (28) and (31). The left-hand sides of (28) and (31) are the mean-square errors of {zw, w ∈
R} and {z˜w′ , w′ ∈ R′} relative to z¯, respectively. Since d+ 1−dR ≤ 1 and d ≤ 1, we see that the bias of {z˜w′ , w′ ∈ R′} to z¯ is
smaller than the bias of {zw, w ∈ R} to z¯, showing the “variance reduction” property of resampling.
Lemma 7. (Full version of Lemma 2) Let {zw, w ∈ W} be a subset of random vectors distributed in a normed vector space
and the random vectors in {zw, w ∈ R} are independent. Generate from {zw, w ∈ W} a new set {z˜w, w ∈ W} using the
resampling strategy with s-replacement. It holds when B < W2s that
E‖geomed ({z˜w, w ∈ W})− z¯‖2 ≤
(
d+
1− d
R
)
C2sα
R
∑
w∈R
E‖zw − Ezw‖2 + dC
2
sα
R
∑
w∈R
‖Ezw − z¯‖2, (40)
where z¯ := 1R
∑
w∈R Ezw, α :=
B
W , Csα :=
2−2sα
1−2sα , and d :=
W−1
sW−1 . Define z˜
∗
 as an -approximate geometric median of
{z˜w, w ∈ W}. It holds when B < W2s that
E‖z˜∗ − z¯‖2 ≤
(
d+
1− d
R
)
2C2sα
R
∑
w∈R
E‖zw − Ezw‖2 + 2dC
2
sα
R
∑
w∈R
‖Ezw − z¯‖2 + 2
2
(W − 2sB)2 . (41)
Proof. For simplicity, we only prove (40). As Lemma 5 claims, when B < Ws , there exists a setR′ ⊆ W with at least W − sB
elements, such that for any w′ ∈ R′, (29) and (30) hold true. When B < W2s , |R
′|
W >
1
2 . With Lemma 4, it holds that
E‖ geomed({z˜w, w ∈ W})− z¯‖2
=E‖ geomed({z˜w − z¯, w ∈ W})‖2
≤C
2
sα
|R′|
∑
w′∈R′
E‖z˜w′ − z¯‖2. (42)
Applying Lemma 6 completes the proof immediately.
Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we review the following supporting lemma for SAGA.
Lemma 8. (Wu et al. 2020, Lemmas 4 and 5) Under Assumption 1, if all regular workers w ∈ W update φkw,ikw and v
k
w
according to (8) and (9), then the corrected stochastic gradient vkw satisfies
E‖vkw − f ′w(xk)‖2 ≤ L2
1
J
J∑
j=1
‖xk − φkw,j‖2, ∀w ∈ W, (43)
and
1
R
∑
w∈R
E‖vkw − f ′w(xk)‖2 ≤ L2Sk, (44)
where Sk is defined as
Sk :=
1
R
∑
w∈R
1
J
J∑
j=1
‖xk − φkw,j‖2. (45)
Further, Sk satisfies
ESk+1 ≤ 4JE‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖2 + 4Jγ2L2‖xk − x∗‖2 + (1− 1
J2
)Sk. (46)
Theorem 2. (Full version of Theorem 1) Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if the number of Byzantine workers satisfies B < W2s and
the step size satisfies
γ ≤ µ
2
√
10J2L2Csα
,
then the iterate xk generated by the proposed method in Algorithm 2 satisfies
E‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− γµ
2
)k∆1 + ∆2, (47)
where
∆1 := ‖x0 − x∗‖2 −∆2, (48)
∆2 :=
5dC2sαδ
2
µ2
, (49)
while α := BW , Csα :=
2−2sα
1−2sα , and d :=
W−1
sW−1 . On the other hand, when the step size satisfies
γ ≤ µ
4
√
5J2L2Csα
,
the iterate xk generated by the proposed method in Algorithm 2 with -approximate geometric median aggregation satisfies
E‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− γµ
2
)k∆1 + 2∆2 +
102
µ2(W − 2sB)2 . (50)
Proof. For simplicity, we only prove (47). According to the proof of Theorem 1 in (Wu et al. 2020), when
γ ≤ µ
2L2
, (51)
it holds that
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− γµ)‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2
γµ
E‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖2. (52)
Then, we construct a Lyapunov function T k1 as
T k1 := ‖xk − x∗‖2 + c1Sk, (53)
where c1 is any positive constant. Since Sk is non-negative according to the definition in (45), we know that T k1 is also non-
negative. Substituting (46) and (52) into (53) yields
ET k+11 ≤ (1− γµ+ 4c1Jγ2L2)‖xk − x∗‖2 + (
2
γµ
+ 4c1J)E‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖2 + (1− 1
J2
)c1S
k. (54)
Note that the second term at the right-hand side of (54) can be bounded with the help of Lemma 7, as
E‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖2 (55)
=γ2E‖geomed ({v˜kw, w ∈ W})− f ′(xk)‖2
≤γ2
(
d+
1− d
R
)
C2sα
R
∑
w∈R
E‖vkw − f ′w(xk)‖2 + γ2
dC2sα
R
∑
w∈R
‖f ′w(xk)− f ′(xk)‖2
≤γ2
(
d+
1− d
R
)
C2sαL
2Sk + γ2dC2sαδ
2,
where the last inequality comes from Lemma 8 and Assumption 2. Therefore, we have
ET k+11 ≤ (1− γµ+ 4c1Jγ2L2)‖xk − x∗‖2 (56)
+
((
1− 1
J2
)
c1 +
(
2
γµ
+ 4c1J
)(
d+
1− d
R
)
C2sαγ
2L2
)
Sk + γ2
(
2
γµ
+ 4c1J
)
dC2αδ
2.
If we constrain the step size γ as
4c1Jγ
2L2 ≤ γµ
2
, (57)
then the coefficients in (56) satisfy
1− γµ+ 4c1Jγ2L2 ≤ 1− γµ
2
, (58)
2
γµ
+ 4c1J ≤ 2
γµ
+
µ
2γL2
≤ 5
2γµ
. (59)
Therefore, we can bound ET k+1 by
ET k+11 ≤(1−
γµ
2
)‖xk − x∗‖2 +
((
1− 1
J2
)
c1 +
5γ
2µ
(
d+
1− d
R
)
C2sαL
2
)
Sk +
5γ
2µ
dC2αδ
2. (60)
Similarly, if γ and c1 are chosen such that
γµ
2
<
1
2J2
, (61)
and
c1 =
5J2γL2(d+ (1− d)/R)C2sα
µ
≥ 5γL
2(d+ (1− d)/R)C2sα/2
µ(1/J2 − γµ/2) , (62)
then the coefficient in (60) satisfies(
1− 1
J2
)
c1 +
5γ
2µ
(
d+
1− d
R
)
C2sαL
2 ≤ (1− γµ
2
)c1. (63)
Hence, (60) becomes
ET k+11 ≤(1−
γµ
2
)‖xk − x∗‖2 + (1− γµ
2
)c1S
k +
5γ
2µ
dC2sαδ
2
=(1− γµ
2
)T k1 +
5γ
2µ
dC2sαδ
2. (64)
Using telescopic cancellation on (64) from time 1 to time k, we have
ET k1 ≤ (1−
γµ
2
)k
[
T 01 −∆2
]
+ ∆2. (65)
Here and thereafter, the expectation is taken over ξki for all regular workers i ∈ R and time t ≤ k − 1. The definition of the
Lyapunov function in (53) implies that
E‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ ET k1 ≤ (1−
γµ
2
)k∆1 + ∆2. (66)
In our derivation so far, the constraint on the step size γ (c.f. (51), (57) and (61)) is
γ ≤ min
{
µ
2L2
,
µ
2
√
10J3/2L2Csα(d+ (1− d)/R)1/2
,
1
J2µ
}
. (67)
Therefore, we simply choose
γ ≤ µ
2
√
10J2L2Csα
, (68)
which completes the proof.
Convergence Property of Byrd-SAGA
The following Theorem establishes the convergence property of Byrd-SAGA. It is close to Theorem 1 in (Wu et al. 2020), but
the bound is tighter due to the use of the improved inequality given by Lemma 4.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if the number of Byzantine workers satisfies B < W2 and the step size satisfies
γ ≤ µ
2
√
10J2L2Cα
,
then the iterate xk generated by Byrd-SAGA satisfies
E‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− γµ
2
)k∆1 + ∆2, (69)
where
∆1 := ‖x0 − x∗‖2 −∆2, (70)
∆2 :=
5
µ2
C2αδ
2. (71)
while α := BW and Cα :=
2−2α
1−2α . On the other hand, when the step size satisfies
γ ≤ µ
4
√
5J2L2Cα
,
the iterate xk generated by the proposed method in Algorithm 2 with -approximate geometric median aggregation satisfies
E‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− γµ)k∆1 + 2∆2 + 10
2
µ2(W − 2B)2 . (72)
Proof. For simplicity, we only prove (69). Construct a Lyapunov function T k2 as
T k2 := ‖xk − x∗‖2 + c2Sk. (73)
According to the proof of Theorem 1 in (Wu et al. 2020), when
γ ≤ µ
2L2
, (74)
it holds that
ET k+12 ≤ (1− γµ+ 4c2Jγ2L2)‖xk − x∗‖2 + (
2
γµ
+ 4c2J)E‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖2 + (1− 1
J2
)c2S
k. (75)
Note that the second term at the right-hand side of (75) can be bounded with the help of Lemma 4, as
E‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖2 (76)
=γ2E‖geomed ({vkw, w ∈ W})− f ′(xk)‖2
≤γ
2C2α
R
∑
w∈R
E‖vkw − f ′w(xk)‖2 +
γ2C2α
R
∑
w∈R
‖f ′w(xk)− f ′(xk)‖2
≤γ2C2αL2Sk + γ2C2αδ2,
where the last inequality comes from Lemma 8 and Assumption 2. Therefore, we have
ET k+12 ≤(1− γµ+ 4c2Jγ2L2)‖xk − x∗‖2 (77)
+
((
1− 1
J2
)
c2 +
(
2
γµ
+ 4c2J
)
C2αγ
2L2
)
Sk + γ2
(
2
γµ
+ 4c2J
)
C2αδ
2.
If we constrain the step size γ as
4c2Jγ
2L2 ≤ γµ
2
, (78)
then the coefficients in (77) satisfy
1− γµ+ 4c2Jγ2L2 ≤ 1− γµ
2
, (79)
2
γµ
+ 4c2J ≤ 2
γµ
+
µ
2γL2
≤ 5
2γµ
. (80)
Therefore, we can bound ET k+1 by
ET k+12 ≤(1−
γµ
2
)‖xk − x∗‖2 +
((
1− 1
J2
)
c2 +
5γ
2µ
C2αL
2
)
Sk +
5γ
2µ
C2αδ
2. (81)
Similarly, if γ and c2 are chosen such that
γµ
2
<
1
2J2
, (82)
and
c2 =
5J2γL2C2α
µ
≥ 5γL
2C2α/2
µ(1/J2 − γµ/2) , (83)
then the coefficient in (81) satisfies (
1− 1
J2
)
c2 +
5γ
2µ
C2αL
2 ≤ (1− γµ
2
)c2. (84)
Hence, (81) becomes
ET k+12 ≤(1−
γµ
2
)‖xk − x∗‖2 + (1− γµ
2
)c2S
k +
5γ
2µ
C2αδ
2 (85)
=(1− γµ
2
)T k2 +
5γ
2µ
C2αδ
2.
Using telescopic cancellation on (85) from time 1 to time k, we have
ET k2 ≤ (1−
γµ
2
)k
[
T 0 −∆2
]
+ ∆2. (86)
Here and thereafter, the expectation is taken over ikw for all regular workers w ∈ R and time t ≤ k − 1. The definition of the
Lyapunov function in (73) implies that
E‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ ET k2 ≤ (1−
γµ
2
)k∆1 + ∆2. (87)
In our derivation so far, the constraint of the step size γ (c.f. (74) (78) and (82)) is
γ ≤ min
{
µ
2L2
,
µ
2
√
10J3/2L2Cα
,
1
J2µ
}
. (88)
Therefore, we simply choose
γ ≤ µ
2
√
10J2L2Cα
, (89)
which completes the proof.
Convergence Property of Byrd-SGD
The following Theorem establishes the convergence property of Byrd-SGD. Again, it is close to Theorem 2 in (Wu et al. 2020),
but the bound is tighter due to the use of the improved inequality given by Lemma 4.
Theorem 4. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, if the number of Byzantine workers satisfies B < W2 and the step size satisfies
γ ≤ µ
2L2
,
then the iterate xk generated by Byrd-SGD satisfies
E‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− γµ)k∆1 + ∆2, (90)
where
∆1 := ‖x0 − x∗‖2 −∆2, (91)
∆2 :=
2
µ2
(
C2ασ
2 + C2αδ
2
)
, (92)
while α := BW and Cα :=
2−2α
1−2α . On the other hand, the iterate x
k generated by Byrd-SGD with -approximate geometric
median aggregation satisfies
E‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− γµ)k∆1 + 2∆2 + 4
2
µ2(W − 2B)2 . (93)
Proof. For simplicity, we only prove (90). Note that inequality (52) is still true for Byrd-SGD with γ < µ2L2 . The only difference
is that we need to bound the term E‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖ with Lemma 4, as
E‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖ (94)
=γ2E‖geomed ({gkw, w ∈ W})− f ′(xk)‖2
≤γ2C
2
α
R
∑
w∈R
E‖f ′w,ikw(x
k)− f ′w(xk)‖2 + γ2
C2α
R
∑
w∈R
‖f ′w(xk)− f ′(xk)‖2
≤γ2C2ασ2 + γ2C2αδ2.
Therefore, we have
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤(1− γµ)‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2
γµ
E‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖2
≤(1− γµ)‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2γ
µ
(
C2ασ
2 + C2αδ
2
)
. (95)
Here and thereafter, the expectation is taken over ikw for all regular workers w ∈ R. Using telescopic cancellation on (95)
completes the proof.
Convergence Property of RS-Byrd-SGD
Theorem 4 shows that the learning error of Byrd-SGD is in the order of O(C2ασ
2 +C2αδ
2). Now, we are going to show that the
learning error of RS-Byrd-SGD is in the order of O((d+ 1−dR )C
2
sασ
2 + dC2sαδ
2).
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, if the number of Byzantine workers satisfies B < W2s and the step size satisfies
γ ≤ µ
2L2
,
then the iterate xk generated by RS-Byrd-SGD satisfies
E‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− γµ)k∆1 + ∆2, (96)
where
∆1 := ‖x0 − x∗‖2 −∆2, (97)
∆2 :=
2
µ2
((
d+
1− d
R
)
C2sασ
2 + dC2sαδ
2
)
. (98)
while α := BW , Csα :=
2−2sα
1−2sα and d :=
W−1
sW−1 . On the other hand, the iterate x
k generated by RS-Byrd-SGD with -
approximate geometric median aggregation satisfies
E‖xk − x∗‖2 ≤ (1− γµ)k∆1 + 2∆2 + 4
2
µ2(W − 2sB)2 . (99)
Proof. For simplicity, we only prove (96). Note that inequality (52) is still true for RS-Byrd-SGD with γ < µ2L2 . The only
difference is that we need to bound the term E‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖ with Lemma 7, as
E‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖ (100)
=γ2E‖geomed ({g˜kw, w ∈ W})− f ′(xk)‖2
≤γ2
((
d+
1− d
R
)
C2sα
R
∑
w∈R
E‖f ′w,ikw(x
k)− f ′w(xk)‖2 +
dC2sα
R
∑
w∈R
‖f ′w(xk)− f ′(xk)‖2
)
≤γ2
((
d+
1− d
R
)
C2sασ
2 + dC2sαδ
2
)
.
Therefore, we have
E‖xk+1 − x∗‖2 ≤(1− γµ)‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2
γµ
E‖xk+1 − xk + γf ′(xk)‖2
≤(1− γµ)‖xk − x∗‖2 + 2γ
µ
((
d+
1− d
R
)
C2sασ
2 + dC2sαδ
2
)
. (101)
Here and thereafter, the expectation is taken over ikw for all regular workers w ∈ R. Using telescopic cancellation on (101)
completes the proof.
